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 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Victor Arvizu pled guilty to two counts of battery 
on jail staff.  He received an aggregate unified sentence of five years, with one year 
fixed.  The district court initially placed Mr. Arvizu on probation; however, after he was 
found to have violated his probation, the district court revoked his probation.   
On appeal, Mr. Arvizu asserts that the district court erred in revoking his 
probation where the violation was not willful, and, assuming arguendo it was willful, it 
did not warrant revocation.  Additionally, Mr. Arvizu asserts that the district court 
deprived him of his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection when it 
revoked his probation because the court believed Mr. Arvizu was mentally ill and was 
not taking mental health medications.   
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State’s arguments made in its 
Respondent’s Brief, and to address the recent Idaho Supreme Court decision in a case 
in which the appellant made a similar argument and which was decided after the 
Respondent’s Brief was filed, State v. Dabney,  ___ P.3d ___, Docket No., 42650 
(February 29, 2016). 
 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Arvizu’s Appellant’s Brief.  They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion in revoking Mr. Arvizu’s probation? 
 
2. In revoking Mr. Arvizu’s probation, did the district court violate Mr. Arvizu’s 
constitutional rights to due process and equal protection? 
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ARGUMENT 
 
 The District Court Violated Mr. Arvizu’s Equal Protection And Due Process Rights 
Under The Idaho And U.S. Constitutions When It Revoked His Probation Simply 
Because It Believed Mr. Arvizu Was Mentally Ill And Should Be Taking Medication For 
The Condition  
       Although the district court recognized that Mr. Arvizu was doing well on 
probation, the court found that Mr. Arvizu was potentially a risk to the community 
because he was not acknowledging that he had a mental health condition and was not 
taking mental health medication.  However, Mr. Arvizu was having a successful 
probation.  Notably, Mr. Arvizu had not shown himself as dangerous or unwell during his 
time on probation—in fact, his probation officer reported that Mr. Arvizu was compliant 
on probation.  Notwithstanding, the district court revoked Mr. Arvizu’s probation. This 
decision violated Mr. Arvizu’s rights to equal protection and due process under the 
Fourteenth Amendment and Article I, Sections 2 and 13 because, had Mr. Arvizu not 
been diagnosed with a mental health condition, he would have remained on probation.   
In Beardon v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983), the United States Supreme Court 
was presented with the question of whether a sentencing court could properly revoke 
probation based on a defendant’s failure to pay a fine without evidence and findings that 
he was somehow responsible for the failure to pay the fine, rather than he simply lacked 
the financial resources.  Beardon, 461 U.S. at 660-661.  The Court stated that whether 
the case is analyzed under the Due Process Clause or the Equal Protection Clause, a 
court must inquire into such factors as “the nature of the individual interest affected, the 
extent to which it is affected, the rationality of the connection between legislative means 
and purpose, [and] the existence of alternative means for effectuating the purpose . . . ”  
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Id. at 666-667 (quoting Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 260 (1970)); State v. Braaten, 
144 Idaho 606, 609 (Ct. App. 2007).  
The State claims that “Arvizu was denied probation . . . because of the effect of 
his untreated mental health issues and resulting likelihood that he could be adequately 
supervised and the community protected if he were placed on probation.”  
(Respondent’s Brief, p.20.)  The State claims that “the state’s strong and legitimate 
interest in protecting society was furthered by the denial of probation based upon 
Arvizu’s failure to follow his probation officer’s order;” however, this analysis is flawed 
where Mr. Arvizu was already on probation.  (Respondent’s Brief, p.20.)  The district 
court was not denying Mr. Arvizu probation, it was affirmatively revoking probation and 
ordering Mr. Arvizu to serve the previously suspended sentence.  Mr. Arvizu had been 
on probation for over a year before the report of probation violation was filed.  (Supp. 
R., pp.6-7.)   
In that way, this case is distinguishable from State v. Dabney—Mr. Arvizu was 
already on probation where the defendant in Dabney was seeking probation after a 
period of retained jurisdiction.    ___ P.3d ___, Docket No., 42650, slip op. at 1–3 
(February 29, 2016).  Unlike Mr. Dabney, Mr. Arvizu had a vested liberty interest in 
continuing on probation.   
While the classification at issue in Dabney was “probation-worthy defendants 
with developmental disabilities versus probation-worthy defendants without disabilities,” 
Mr. Arvizu’s classification was that of a mentally ill probationer versus a probationer who 
was not mentally ill.  Id. ___ P.3d ___, Docket No., 42650, slip op. at 9-10.  Had 
Mr. Arvizu not been diagnosed with a mental illness, there would have been no basis for 
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revocation.  It is not oversimplifying the issue to say Mr. Arvizu’s probation was revoked 
because he had been diagnosed with mental illness.   
While “a trial court may deny probation if it is of the opinion that imprisonment is 
necessary to protect society,” the question presented here is whether a defendant’s 
mental health diagnosis may be factored into the analysis without violation of 
constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection.  Braaten, 144 Idaho at 
608.  In this case the answer is no, it may not. 
The district court violated Mr. Arvizu’s due process right by incarcerating him 
simply because he had been diagnosed with a mental health condition which the court 
believed he should acknowledge and medicate.  Mr. Arvizu had a due process right and 
a legitimate claim to continue on probation, and the Fourteenth Amendment’s due 
process protections applied to the district court’s decision to revoke probation.   
Furthermore, Mr. Arvizu’s equal protection right is implicated where the court’s 
decision to revoke probation based on Mr. Arvizu’s classification was not rationally 
related to the various legitimate government interests in this case.  Idaho’s interests at 
sentencing are ensuring public safety, followed by rehabilitation, deterrence, and 
retribution.  State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 834 (2011).  Idaho also has an interest in 
treating mentally ill defendants, rather than incarcerating such defendants for a 
substantial period of time.  State v. Durham, 146 Idaho 364, 369-370 (Ct. App. 2008).  
But the classification drawn here—probationers with a mental health diagnosis versus 
probationers without a mental diagnosis—is not rationally related to any of those 
interests.  Such a classification actually undermines the State’s interest in treating 
instead of incarcerating defendants with mental illness.          
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Further, alternatives were available to the probation officer, in lieu of seeking 
revocation of Mr. Arvizu’s probation.  For example, under I.C. § 66-329, the probation 
officer could have had Mr. Arvizu committed to the custody of Idaho Department of 
Health & Welfare, upon a showing that Mr. Arvizu was mentally ill and either likely to 
injure himself or others or was gravely disabled due to mental illness.  I.C. § 66-329.  It 
is through this mechanism that the Idaho Legislature provided for the potential risks 
associated with those persons who are mentally ill.   
   Ultimately, the district court treated Mr. Arvizu, a probationer with a diagnosed 
mental health condition, differently than those probationers without a mental health 
condition.  In revoking Mr. Arvizu’s probation and incarcerating him simply because he 
had been diagnosed with a mental health condition, the district court violated 
Mr. Arvizu’s rights to equal protection and due process. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Arvizu respectfully requests that this Court remand this case with an order 
that he be placed back on probation.  Alternatively, Mr. Arvizu asks this Court to vacate 
the order revoking his probation and remand the case for a new hearing. 
 DATED this 1st day of April, 2016. 
 
      ___________/s/______________ 
      SALLY J. COOLEY 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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